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1. Introduction 
 
In this report we review the main measures proposed by the Portuguese Budget 
Laws of 2012, 2013 and 2014, which were finally not accepted by the Portuguese 
Constitutional Court. Such fiscal measures have a macroeconomic impact that can be 
assessed by taking into account notably: i) a measure of the fiscal multiplier; ii) and 
measures of fiscal elasticities for either the overall budgetary balance or for the relevant 
individual budgetary items.  
For the fiscal multipliers, several sources are available, both from the European 
Commission and from the OECD, and this is also the case for the budgetary elasticities. 
Still, we have also estimated tentative elasticities for the relevant budgetary items. 
Those measures, once accepted or rejected by the Portuguese Constitutional Court, 
change both the composition, but also the size of the budget balance, and so it is 
possible to gauge their impact in terms of the public finances sustainability, and, notably, 
its relevance for the future turning point of the currently still upward looking path of the 
debt-to-GDP ratio. In this context, a simulation exercise for alternative debt ratio paths 
will be provided to determine plausible turning points and to illustrate challenges to fiscal 
sustainability. 
In section two we review the main measures included in the 2013 and 2014 Budget 
Laws, which were then replaced, following the assessment of the Portuguese 
Constitutional Court. In section three we assess the macro impact of those changes. 
Section four concludes the report. 
 
2. Measures in the 2013 and 2014 Budget Laws 
2.1. 2013 Budget, measures that were revised 
The 2013 budget original version included the holiday allowances suspension (1/14 
of the annual wage) paid to public servants and to pensioners. This suspension was 
formulated as follows: 
 for wages below 600€ per month, the suspension was not to be applied; 
 for wages between 600€ and 1100€, the allowance would be equal to 1320€ - 
1.2 times the monthly remuneration; 
 for wages above 1100€, the allowance would be completely suspended.  
Following the Constitutional Court decision number 187/2013, this suspension was 
ruled as unconstitutional, and the Portuguese government had to pay back holiday 
allowances to public servants and pensioners.  
The necessary amendment to the budget was presented in May 2013 
(supplementary budget). The forecast budget deficit was then 5.5 percent of GDP for 
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2013 (the earlier estimate was 4.5 percent). This deficit revision was accompanied by a 
worsening of macroeconomic perspectives. 
Restoring holiday allowances had an impact of 1274 million euros in the budget 
deficit, according to official estimates (see the 2013 government supplementary budget 
report).  
Some more compensation measures were envisaged, but no precise quantification 
was provided. These measures were the following:  
 measures of structural spending reduction in all ministries; 
 diminishing charges with public/private partnerships; 
 measures to reduce the levels of tax evasion and of the parallel economy. 
 
Regarding the measures in the 2012 Budget Law, later considered not 
constitutionally acceptable (the reduction of 2/14 of the annual wage), but still allowed to 
be in place in 2012, one can hypothesise that they were a restriction for the formulation 
of the 2013 Budget. Therefore, in the absence of such constitutional ruling, the 2013 
Budget might have had a lower level of wages. In practice, that would mean, for the 
sake of our simulations, having less the equivalent of two wages and the corresponding 
reduction in personal income taxes. We will discuss this additional scenario later in the 
next section. 
 
2.2. 2014 Budget, measures that were revised 
The 2014 Budget Law included provisions that aimed at aligning the public sector 
pension scheme with the general system. 
On 19 December 2013, the Constitutional Court ruled that these provisions were 
unconstitutional. Spending with pensions was then to increase by 734.9 million euros. 
Consequently, the government intended to fill this gap by redesigning two measures: 
i) an increase in the CES (Extraordinary Solidarity Contribution, Contribuição  
Extraordinária de Solidariedade), namely through the lowering of both the 
threshold below which pensions are exempted and of the thresholds above 
which the highest contribution rates apply (official numbers provided an 
estimated increase in receipts of 576 million euros).  
ii) a further increase by one percentage point (from 2.5 percent to 3.5 percent) of 
the beneficiaries' contribution to the special public sector health insurance 
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schemes (ADSE, SAD, ADM)1 with a view to ensuring the self-financing of these 
systems (the estimated increase in receipts amounts to 132.7 million euros). 
The first compensation measure was presented in a supplementary budget in the 
beginning of 2014. Moreover, the changes to ADSE will be implemented via a Decree 
Law which does not require parliamentary approval. Both of these measures should 
apply from the second quarter of 2014 onwards.  
 
3. Assessing the macro effects 
3.1. The budgetary elasticities 
It is important to know how several key budgetary components react to changes in 
the respective base. For instance, by how much is the budget balance going to change, 
as a percentage of GDP, for a 1 percent change in GDP, which we can measure via the 
budget balance semi-elasticity. The main budgetary items, for which such elasticities are 
usually computed, are: the corporate tax revenues; the personal income tax revenues; 
the revenues from the social security contributions; current spending; and the total 
budget balance. For the case of the indirect tax revenues, an elasticity of one is 
commonly assumed, notably by international organizations (see Girouard and André, 
2005, for the OECD approach, and Mourre et al., 2013 for the EC approach).  
For the specific case of Portugal, both the OECD and the EC report a semi-elasticity 
of 0.46 for the total budget balance (vis-à-vis a change of 1 percent in GDP). On the 
other hand, Afonso and Claeys (2008) report for Portugal elasticities of 0.67 and 1.58 
respectively for total spending and total revenue (for the period 1970-2004). 
In the case of 2014, the compensation measures imply an increase in taxes and 
social security. Although we are going to use the elasticity of the overall budget balance, 
we have also computed elasticities for the three main items of budgetary revenues for 
Portugal. In Table A1 in the Appendix we can see that such elasticities range from 1.3 to 
1.7 in the period 1978-2013. 
 
 
3.2. The fiscal multipliers 
In order to assess the effect on GDP of changes in the fiscal components of the 
budget balance, and of the budget balance itself, it is important to have an idea of the 
fiscal multiplier(s).2 Such calculations are rather difficult and quite often they are not 
                                                          
1
 ADSE - Direção-Geral de Proteção Social aos Trabalhadores em Funções Públicas; SAD - Serviços de 
Assistência na Doença;.ADM - Assistência na Doença aos Militares. 
2
 The fiscal multiplier is the ratio of a change in GDP (ΔY) after an exogenous change in the budget deficit or 
budgetary spending (ΔG) with respect to the baseline (potential GDP and structural deficit, respectively, 
although authors use variations of these concepts). 
 4 
 
consensual in the literature, both in terms of the sign and in terms of the magnitude of 
the multiplier. Moreover, crisis multipliers also tend to exacerbate more the fiscal effects 
on GDP.  
In some studies, a cumulative multiplier of government spending larger than one is 
sometimes uncovered. Ramey (2011) recently surveyed the government spending 
multiplier within a bracket of 0.8 and 1.5, while Spilimbergo et al. (2009) report 
multipliers between 0.5 and 1.0 for medium-sized countries and 0.5 or less for small 
open economies (see also Illing and Watzka, 2013). For instance, Afonso and Sousa 
(2012), using a Bayesian Structural Vector Autoregression for the US, the UK, Germany 
and Italy report that government spending shocks, in general, have a small effect on 
Gross GDP.  
For the case of Portugal, Afonso and Sousa (2011a) report the large persistence of 
government spending, which hampers the actions of the fiscal authorities to act upon the 
economy in a timely and temporary manner to stabilize the economy, with a downside 
also in terms of fiscal sustainability.3  
In addition, Afonso and St. Aubyn (2009) document the existence of positive effects 
of public investment on output, for Portugal, therefore a positive multiplier for this 
budgetary component, in the period 1960-2005. Still for Portugal, Pereira and Wemans 
(2013) report average one year cumulative fiscal multipliers of 0.2 for public 
consumption, 1.7 for the compensation of employees, and -1.2 for direct taxes.  
Finally, according to simulations by the ECB (2014), a fiscal consolidation in small 
countries, amounting to 1 percent of GDP reduces domestic GDP by 0.45 percent 
(cumulative effect over a three-year period). 
 
3.3. Fiscal and macro effects 
In order to assess the macro effects of the changes done in the 2013 and 2014 
Budget Laws, we have used a semi-elasticity of 0.46 for the budget balance (notably as 
in Girouard and André, 2005, and the EC). Regarding the fiscal multiplier, we have used 
for our benchmark calculations the value of 0.5 (see Box 1). We report in Table 1 the 
results for the benchmark scenario. 
From Table 1 we can conclude that the immediate worsening of the budget balance 
is around 0.54 percent of GDP and 0.44 percent of GDP respectively in 2013 and in 
2014. Therefore, such an increase in the budget deficit would have resulted in a more 
expansionary fiscal policy in both years. Taking into account the feedback effect that 
                                                          
3
 Still, for instance Afonso and Sousa (2011b) mention that for Portugal, the effects on GDP are negative 
and government spending has a “crowding-out” effect on the private sector. More specifically, a 1 percent 
positive shock in government spending has a maximum impact on GDP of −0.1 percent. 
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such fiscal impulse has in the economy, via the multiplier and the semi-elasticity, we 
observe an impact on the budget balance of -0.42 percent of GDP and of -0.34 percent 
of GDP respectively for 2013 and for 2014. 
Considering the compensation measures proposed by the Government, we see that 
the effect on the budget balance is almost negligible for the case of 2014, being the 
expected effect on GDP also residual. 
 
Table 1 - Central estimates (% of GDP) 
 2013 2014 
1. Withdrawn measures  0.539 0.437 
         1.1 Impact on GDP 0.270 0.219 
     1.2 Impact on budget balance, with feedback 
 
-0.415 -0.337 
2. Compensation measures n.a. -0.421 
      2.1 Impact on GDP n.a. -0.211 
      2.2 Impact on budget balance with feedback 
 
n.a. 0.325 
3. Withdrawn + compensation measures (1+2) 0.539 0.016 
      3.1 Impact on GDP 0.270 0.008 
      3.2 Impact on budget balance, with feedback -0.415 -0.012 
 
In terms of the possible effect on unemployment we can recall Okun’s Law (Okun, 
1962), which measures potential output in terms of the unemployment gap, implying a 
direct relation between increases in unemployment and output growth.  
We assume here from the literature, as usually accepted, that for each 2-2.5 
percent drop in GDP, relatively to potential GDP, the unemployment rate increases by 
around 1 percent (see Ball, Leigh and Loungani, 2012). Therefore, in the cases of 2013 
and 2014, the impact of the fiscal expansion on GDP, could result in rather mitigated 
reductions in the unemployment of around 0.1 percent. 
In order to provide some sensitivity analysis notably regarding the use of different 
magnitudes for the fiscal multiplier and for the budgetary semi-elasticity, we report in 
Table 2 a summary grid of the effects on the budget balance, considering the respective 
feedback4. The central result in Table 2 is in the first cell of the table, for each year, and 
the fiscal multiplier ranges from 0.5 to 1, while the semi-elasticity is in the interval 
between 0.46 and 1. The results show that the maximum effects on the budget balance 
are the ones reported as our benchmark hypothesis. Naturally, if one assumes a higher 
fiscal multiplier, the increased fiscal expansion effect on GDP will counteract by more 
the initial worsening of the fiscal balance.  
                                                          
4
 Note that a positive budget surplus semi-elasticity implicitly assumes that spending is less influenced by 
GDP than revenues are. Moreover, a given budget surplus semi-elasticity is consistent with different values 
for the budget items elasticities. The range considered in Table 2 for 2013 is consistent with our elasticities 
estimated values and the weights on GDP for different revenue items.  
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For instance, and for 2013, one sees that considering a fiscal multiplier of one, 
instead of 0.5, would result in a change on the budget balance, with feedback, of only 
around -0.29. The same conclusion is true for the case of 2014 (around -0.34 in this 
case). 
 
Table 2 - Ranges for the change in the budget balance with feedback 
2013 2014 
 Budget balance multiplier  Budget balance multiplier 
Semi-
elasticity 0,50 0,75 1,00 
Semi-
elasticity 0,50 0,75 1,00 
0,46 -0,415 -0,353 -0,291 -0,337 -0,286 -0,236 -0,337 
0,75 -0,337 -0,236 -0,135 -0,273 -0,191 -0,109 -0,273 
1,00 -0,270 -0,135 0,000 -0,219 -0,109 0,000 -0,219 
 
In terms of the 2013 Budget we can also assess the aforementioned cut of two 
wages and the ensuing reduction in personal income revenue, stemming from 
maintaining hypothetically the 2012 situation. One can consider that personal income 
tax was increased in 2013 to account for the effect of one more salary that was to be 
paid again in 2013. This means, and in a world where the Constitutional Court would not 
rule such measure as unconstitutional, that one would have seen, as compared to what 
effectively happened in 2013: 
- a reduction in spending by the amount of two wages; 
- the reduction in personal income tax, equivalent to one wage 
This is in fact equivalent to a net reduction of one wage in the budget deficit. The 
results of such scenario for 2013 are in practice symmetrical to the one we report in 
Table 2 for the same year, as we can easily conclude from the abovementioned 
explanations. Therefore, in that additional simulation we would have in 2013 a baseline 
improvement of the budget balance of around 0.42 percent of GDP. 
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Box 1: Some remarks on the adjustment program theoretical underpinnings and on our 
neutral and technical approach 
 
The adjustment program is strongly influenced by the following theoretical underpinnings: 
(i) A successful fiscal consolidation is to be based on essentially spending reductions (as 
opposed to tax increases). Spending reduction procedures are better quality measures as they 
allow for efficiency gains ("more with less"); 
(ii) Accomplishment chances are increased when the program is front loaded. Spending cuts are 
to be taken immediately, and this will increase credibility, a necessary condition to get better 
financing conditions.  
(iii) Recovery is to be attained as external competitiveness is restored.  The economy has 
necessarily to switch from non-tradable to tradable goods production, and exports must increase 
to close the external deficit and indebtedness. For this goal will concur labour wage reductions to 
ensure decreased unit labour costs.  
(iv) Future growth prospects will be enhanced by structural reforms, which will attract domestic 
and foreign private investment. These reforms concern a more flexible labour market, a better 
functioning judicial system, streamlining public administration complex procedures, and generally 
a decrease in so called context costs.  
 
It is clearly beyond the scope of this paper to critically assess the theoretical and empirical 
foundations of the Portuguese adjustment program. As one could expect, ours was a neutral and 
technical approach. In order to clarify this, we found it useful to remark the following: 
(i) We considered a spending multiplier equal to a tax multiplier. In our simulations, a one euro 
increase in taxes causes the very same GDP contraction as a one euro decrease in spending. As 
stated by OECD (2012):   
"Successful fiscal consolidations in the past have been largely driven by spending cuts due to 
political economy considerations and their positive impacts on efficiency and, when concentrated 
on transfers and other current spending, their perceived durability".  
This preference for spending cuts does not derive from empirical evidence on smaller spending 
multipliers as compared to tax multipliers. In fact, some recent research points towards the 
opposite, as referred by Boussard, de Castro and Salto (2012):  
"The review of the literature presented above allows drawing the following conclusions, despite 
the large variation in estimates and the difficulty in comparing them. Assessing the current size of 
fiscal multipliers is complex, in that the value taken depends on its composition, its permanent 
nature, and on the economic environment at large. The large majority of estimates of first-year 
spending multipliers in normal times are located in the range of 0.4 to 1.2. The values are lower – 
quite often below 0.7 - for tax multipliers." 
In what comes to a conservative approach, and taken into account the large variation found in 
the literature, we did not consider a smaller tax multiplier than a spending one.  
 (ii) We remained neutral in what concerns the frontloading/back loading debate. In our 
simulations, multipliers do not depend on the timing a decision is taken or implemented. The 
interested reader may refer to the writings of Blanchard and Leigh (2013) where some arguments 
favouring back loading are mentioned. 
(iii) We have also considered that replacing some unconstitutional measures (essentially public 
sector pension and wage cuts) by other measures (including tax increases) would not imply that 
structural reforms with a possible impact on potential GDP were not to be pursued. Namely, we 
implicitly considered that pursuing efficiency in public administration does not depend on across 
the board wage cuts.  
 
References  
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Consolidations", European Economy Economic Papers 460, European Commission, July. 
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Economics Department Policy Notes, No. 12, April. 
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3.4. Effects on the path of the debt ratio 
In Table 3 we report the effect on the debt ratio of the aforementioned Constitutional 
Court decisions. The results reported in Table 3 are based on the following assumptions 
and procedures: 
  from 2013 to 2017, the "actual surplus" and the "actual government debt" 
correspond to observed figures and forecasts taken from the EC (2014). 
  the figures from 2018 onwards were projected by us assuming the maintenance 
of nominal GDP growth rates. 
  budget deficits were assumed to stabilize at 0.5 percent of GDP from 2020 
onwards. These figures take into account the fact that the 2013 measures (the 13th 
month wage cuts) were actually not taken. 
  had those measures not been taken, the budget deficit in 2013 would have been 
smaller (less 0.415 percent of GDP). However, and by our assumption, budget 
surpluses (or deficits) in 2014 and in following years would not have been different.  
 
Comparing the government debt paths, one concludes that the difference is of about 
0.41 percent of GDP and declines smoothly to about 0.16 percent of GDP in 2040.  
 
Table 3 – Simulation for the general government debt (% of GDP) 
 Actual surplus 
(without 
measures) 
Surplus with 
measures 
Actual 
government debt 
(without 
measures) 
Government debt 
with measures 
2013 -5.89 -5.48 129.38 128.97 
2014 -4.04 -4.04 126.59 126.18 
2015 -2.53 -2.53 125.79 125.39 
2016 -2.00 -2.00 123.40 123.01 
2017 -1.70 -1.70 119.90 119.53 
2018 -1.40 -1.40 117.02 116.66 
2019 -1.00 -1.00 113.85 113.50 
2020 -0.50 -0.50 110.28 109.95 
…     
2040 -0.50 -0.50 60.56 60.40 
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Figure 1 – Alternative paths for the general government debt (% of GDP) 
 
 
The two government debt time paths presented in Table 3 are depicted in Figure 1 
(black and green lines). The solid black line is our estimate of a world where the 2013 
measures would not have been considered unconstitutional. The green line with the 
circles represents the state of the world where measures were withdrawn but quickly 
compensated. By "quickly compensated" we mean that the 2014 budget deficit was not 
affected by the Constitutional Court decisions about the 2013 budget. Implicitly, those 
withdrawn measures were then compensated in the following year.  
 
 Two other hypotheses are also reported in Figure 1 (see Appendix 2 for a table with 
values): 
- in a "gradual compensation" scenario, it is assumed that budget deficits would 
have been higher not only in 2013, but also from 2014 to 2017 (line with 
squares). 
- in a more extreme "without compensation" scenario, the budget deficit would 
have remained higher for ever (dotted line), with the 0.415 worsening effect in 
the deficit from 2013 (in Table 2) staying uncompensated throughout the period 
of analysis.  
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The gradual compensation scenario implies that government debt is about 0.85 
percent of GDP higher than the baseline in 2020. This difference amounts to 
approximately 2.95 percent when there is no compensation at all.  
 
4. Conclusion 
In this report we have assessed the macroeconomic impact of the main measures 
proposed by the Portuguese Budget Laws of 2012, 2013 and 2014 that were not 
accepted by the Portuguese Constitutional Court. Our main conclusions, regarding the 
budget deficit, the path for the debt-to-GDP ratio, GDP and unemployment are as 
follows: 
 
1) the worsening of the budget balance is around 0.54 percent of GDP and 0.44 
percent of GDP respectively in 2013 and in 2014; 
2) considering the feedback effect of such fiscal impulse, the impact on the budget 
balance is -0.42 percent and of -0.34 percent of GDP respectively for 2013 and 
for 2014; 
3) maintaining hypothetically the 2012 situation, a cut of two wages, and the 
ensuing reduction in personal income revenue, would have in 2013 a baseline 
improvement of the budget balance of around +0.42 percent of GDP. 
4) with the compensation measures proposed by the Government, the effect on the 
budget balance and on GDP is negligible in 2014; 
5) in 2013 and in 2014, the impact of the fiscal expansion on GDP, following the 
withdrawn of the measures, could result in rather mitigated reductions in the 
unemployment rate of around 0.1 percent. 
6) the impact on the government debt level is around 0.42 percent of GDP in 2013 
and declining from then on, in a conservative estimate, and about 2.95 percent 
of GDP in 2020 in the worst case scenario.  
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Appendix 1 
 
We report in Table A1 the budgetary elasticities, for the period 1978-2013, resulting 
from three simple regressions. The dependent variables, from the revenue side, are the 
logarithm of direct taxes received, the logarithm of indirect taxes received and the 
logarithm of social contributions received by general government. Coefficients were 
calculated regression the dependent variables on an intercept and on the logarithm of 
the GDP using heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation robust (HAC) standard errors. We 
considered three different samples: the first one, unrestricted, from 1978 up to 2013; the 
second one from 1978 up to 1997; and the last one from 1998 up to 2013. The results 
are rather in line with existing previous analysis. 
Table A1 – Budgetary elasticities, Portugal 
  
Direct 
Taxes 
Indirect 
Taxes 
Social Security 
Contributions 
1978-2013 1.6578 1.3103 1.6767 
1978-1997 1.7670 1.2971 1.6764 
1998-2013 1.1681 1.4769 2.1958 
 
In addition, fiscal multipliers of six simple regressions are displayed in Table A2. 
The covariates are the logarithm of direct taxes, the logarithm of indirect taxes and the 
logarithm of social security contributions received by general government. The 
coefficients were calculated regressing the dependent variables, logarithm of GDP and 
unemployment rate, on an intercept and on the regressors using heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation robust (HAC) standard errors. We considered three samples: the first 
one, unrestricted, from 1978 up to 2013 (second and fifth columns); the second from 
1978 up to 1997 (third and sixth columns); and the last one from 1998 up to 2013 (fourth 
and last columns). The fact that the analysis was made with simple regressions, without 
control for other factors, might explain the large values of the last column.   
Table A2 – Fiscal multipliers, Portugal 
  Log(GDP) Unemployment 
 
1978-
2013 
1978-
1997 
1998-
2013 
1978-
2013 
1978-
1997 
1998-
2013 
Direct Taxes 0.5801 0.5242 0.2437 1.3546 -2.2208 24.6997 
Indirect Taxes 0.7512 0.7425 0.4753 1.5703 -3.1503 11.4992 
Social Security Contributions 0.5907 0.5845 0.3863 1.4512 -2.6140 22.7197 
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Appendix 2 
 
In all cases the government debt path was computed from the dynamic debt equation, 
with all variables as ratio of GDP: 
 
 tttt sfaSDD  1  (1) 
 
where D is nominal debt, S is budget balance surplus, sfa is the stock-flow adjustment  
(the stock/flow adjustments and nominal GDP changes were taken from EC, 2014).  
 
Table A3 contains values that correspond to the "gradual compensation" and the 
"without compensation" scenarios described in the main text and depicted in Figure 1 
(Table 3 in the main text contains the other scenarios figures).  
In the gradual compensation hypothesis, the budget surplus converges progressively 
to the quick compensation figure. The complete convergence is achieved in 2018 only. In 
the without compensation scenario, the budget deficit is always 0.415 percentage points 
of GDP above the quick compensation baseline.  
 
Table A3 - The gradual compensation and the without compensation scenarios 
(% of GDP) 
 
Year 
GDP 
nominal 
growth 
(%) 
Gradual 
compensation 
scenario  
Without 
compensation 
scenario 
Budget 
surplus Debt 
Budget 
surplus  Debt  
2013 0.1 -5.89  129.38    -5.89    129.38    
2014 1.7 -4.35  126.90    -4.45    127.00    
2015 2.5 -2.75  126.31    -2.95    126.61    
2016 3.4 -2.12  124.02    -2.42    124.61    
2017 3.7 -1.72  120.51    -2.12    121.48    
2018 3.7 -1.40  117.61    -1.82    118.96    
2019 3.7 -1.00  114.42    -1.42    116.13    
2020 3.7 -0.50  110.83    -0.92    112.90    
  Note: 2013 - 2018 GDP nominal growth rates were taken from EC (2014). 
